throughout the 20 th century, the attempt to view the Nazi genocide as just one instance among others crops up now and then in public discourse with unfailing regularity.
The truth is that the Holocaust presents some features that are absolutely unique, to wit: the decision to exterminate not just one group as such, but every single human being classified as belonging to that group, to the last one of its members; the centrality of antiSemitism in Nazi ideology, which takes extermination beyond all political and military rationality (think of the formidable logistics for ensuring the transportation of the deported, especially after deportations were intensified in 1943, a time of mounting difficulties in the area of military transportation); the industrial scale of the genocide, evinced by the logistical organization already alluded to and by the efficient planning of mass extermination, which was characterized by a technological rationality that comprised the gas chambers, crematoria, and the full utilizatio of the i ti s odil e ai s as a ate ial.
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Such uniqueness is indeed the mark of a consummate case of absolute violence, and it is in this respect that the Holocaust presents itself as a paradigm. Affirming the uniqueness of the Nazi genocide does not mean that it cannot be compared to other extreme historical events of a similar nature -in fact, that very uniqueness adds relevance to such comparisons, which are not only legitimate but also necessary. 3 Moreover, it is crucial to bear in mind that the unique significance of Auschwitz resides not just in the unique nature of the facts themselves, but also in the relevance of the memory-work it generated. As Helmut Dubiel (2003) rightly points out, there is no doubt that nowadays the Holocaust is an indispensable metanarrative for any other phenomenon of large-scale violence. But that means that the Holocaust, while retaining its historical singularity, is seen by our contemporary consciousness not just as an event set in the past, but rather as something that is still present. That presentification is the result of a long process that for the most part did not start until the 1960s, and in which the work of memory plays a much more decisive role than the work of history. That is the question I wish to dwell on here -the place of the Holocaust in contemporary consciousness does not stem merely from its representing a set of historical facts marked by the uniqueness of absolute violence, but is rather a function of the depth of the memory work associated with it. Such depth is based on a new paradigm of 2 On the modernity of the Holocaust, see Zygmunt Bauma s o lassi stud . Bau a s e t al theses a e fo eshado ed i H. G. Adle s poo l disse i ated studies see fo i sta e . 3 Paul Gilroy, among others, has stressed the need to develop a comparative perspective between post-colonial theory and Holocaust theory (Gilroy, 2000) . testimony that, among other things, radically questions the role and the concept of the victim, presenting itself in these times of ours, through its multiple cross-generational ramifications, as an extremely vigorous discursive formation.
In Die Schuldfrage (The Question of German Guilt), a long, nowadays perhaps somewhat neglected, essay published in 1946, 4 shortly after the end of World War II (Jaspers, 1987) , German philosopher Karl Jaspers established a few definitions that still strike me as rather pertinent and that will be used in my argument. Jaspers starts out by rejecting a loose concept of guilt as well as the assignment of collective guilt to the German people -because in his eyes the mere concept of collective guilt is absurd, and for good reason. Instead, he submits four concepts, which correspond to as many different dimensions of the same problem. First of all he identifies criminal guilt, arising from a responsibility for crimes that can be objectively established through evidence and subject to sentencing in common courts. The second type of guilt is political guilt. It is generated by decisions emanating from state institutions and can only be subjected to sanctions imposed in the framework of situations where the winners are in charge. In other words, in case of defeat, the winning powers may establish a new legal framework that criminalizes acts that were formerly beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. This was precisely what happened with the Nuremberg court, whose most outstanding feat, as is well known, was the establishment of the concept of crimes against humanity. Thus, the definition of political guilt in the Jaspersian sense enabled the creation of a decisive legal precedent.
Thi dl , the e is Jaspe s defi itio of moral guilt, a concept which implies ethical responsibility for participating in criminal acts, even where there is no criminal responsibility involved (typically, being forced to carry out orders while having no means of evading them).
This particular dimension of guilt has to do with the individual conscience, and the tribunal is that of o e s o o s ie e. Jaspe s fou th a d last oncept is that of metaphysical guilt, which involves a notion of responsibility that is independent of any act of commission or omission on the part of the individual, since it refers to the sense of responsibility felt by every human being regarding all violence against another human being. This is then a Ludwigsburg with the purpose of initiating proceedings against Nazi criminals. The work carried out by the Central Office, which was expressly created to investigate crimes that had been committed outside Germany, and that for this reason had so far evaded the jurisdiction of West German courts, was to become extremely important, even if it had to overcome numerous obstacles over the years. Right at the beginning, for instance, it had to face the iole t oppositio of A to "au , the it s mayor, who feared that the new office of judicial investigation might give Lud igs u g a ad a e. But the offi e s a ti ities soo ega to bear fruit, and within just a few years they gained full public visibility with the sessions of the so-alled Aus h itz t ial (1963) (1964) (1965) of officials of the Auschwitz concentration camp.
These were the first major trial proceedings initiated the )e t ale "telle, with many others to follow.
Despite the importance of such moments of affirmation of the judiciary vis-a-vis the rationale of virulent self-exculpation on the part of vast sectors of German society, the Offi e s a ti ities al a s et ith politi al o st u tio , a d the e as i deed a sig ifi a t disproportion between the number of cases prosecuted and the number of actual convictions (not to mention the fact that the latter were often rather light or just symbolic at that). In fact, out of 106,496 people who were investigated as part of about 15,000 cases (typically against more than one defendant per case), only 6495 were actually convicted. In some particularly sensitive areas, such as those permeated by the myth that the regular army had never been involved in criminal actions, 7 the disparity is even more blatant. Thus, of about 1000 cases prosecuted against members of the Wehrmacht who were accused of war crimes, not even one was brought to court.
8
For obvious generational reasons, that phase is now virtually over. One should not expect to see many more Nazi criminals being prosecuted. The case against John Demianiuk, a camp guard at Sobibor who is currently being tried in Munich, may well be the last and -given the advanced age of the defendant, already 89 years old when the proceedings started, on 30
November 2009 -may not even come to an end.
Was justice done then? In truth, only to a limited extent, as one can easily see: many criminals ended up unpunished, and in any event reparation to the victims could not but be disproportionately small, not just because of the irreparable enormity of the pain that was inflicted, but also because -as Shoshana Felman, among others, point outs (2001) -current jurisprudence is not victim-centred, but rather centred on reparation to society. In the conventional space of the courtroom, the victim's testimony is relevant only insofar as it contributes to evidence building. All other dimensions of the testimony are thus rendered secondary, with the frequent result that reenacting the trauma entails no process of liberation for the victim, but a new punishment instead. In other words, within the context of the courtroom memory should be at the sole service of historical reconstruction and therefore remain subordinate to history and to fact-finding, relegating the witness to a minor role in a judicial machinery that totally transcends him/her.
As we all know, the amount of historical knowledge that is available today, after more than 60 years devoted to the study of Nazi crimes and the Holocaust in particular, is huge and virtually unmanageable. One may safely say that historical knowledge regarding the Nazi genocide of the Jews and the whole of National Socialist crimes against humanity is now firmly established. Although historical studies continue to be carried out in significant numbers, mostly with a local emphasis, the basic facts have long been established and 7 The myth fell apart once and for all after the mid-1990s, in the wake of the exhibition on the Wehrmacht war crimes. Organized by the Hamburg Institute for Social Research, the exhibition was shown in many cities throughout Germany and Austria over several years and amidst great controversy (Heer and Naumann, 1995; Heer, 2005 6 and 64). Which is to say that the real witness, the one with the ultimate, most vivid knowledge, is that who, paradoxically, is unable to testify.
But Levi does not view this apparently insoluble aporia as paralyzing. On the contrary, it distinctly gives the ethics of testimony a very precise meaning in that it sets its limits, but in no way does it make one overlook the fact that the witness is also, etymologically, terstis, a 9 The concept of postmemory was first introduced by Marianne Hirsch in her study on photography, narrative and memory (Hirsch, 1997) . In a recent essay, she defines the concept in the following manner: Postmemory describes the relationship of the second generation to powerful, often traumatic, experiences that preceded their births but that were nevertheless transmitted to them so deeply as to seem to constitute memories in their own right Hi s h, : .
third party, who happened to be present and therefore is also in a position to attest to the veracity of the facts, and all the more so when, as is here the case, the testifying third party can also speak in the first person. This despite the fact that, by reason of the mere reality of su i al, the it ess s status a ot ut e p o le ati al, a o di g to Le i, e ause -as the latter unflaggingly insists -being allowed a few privileges, no matter how small, or establishing even a minimal degree of complicity with the exterminators were common o ditio s fo su i al i the death a ps uthless a hi e . This makes testimony even more difficult, because a victim status carries with it, if only to an infinitesimal degree, the ambiguity of having once been an accomplice as well. This uniquely disturbing problem is
dis ussed i the G a )o e, o e of the hapte s i P i o Le i s The Drowned and the
Saved. This particular chapter contains the following remarks about the possibility of bearing witness on the part of the extremely few survivors of the teams in charge of the most terrifying work carried out in the death camps -operating the crematoria:
From men who have known such extreme destitution one cannot expect a deposition in the juridical sense of the term, but something that is at once a lament, a curse, an expiation, and an attempt to justify and rehabilitate themselves. One should expect a liberating outburst instead of a Medusa-faced truth. (Levi, 1989: 36) The distinction Levi here makes between testimony in the legal se se a d a i ti s testimony is crucial if one is to understand that a broad sense of the concept is indeed what we find underlying the transformation of the Holocaust into a universal paradigm. Levi repeatedly reminds us that testimonies should be read with a critical eye (ibid.: 6): an eyewitness is neither a historian nor a philosopher (ibid.: 122), and for the average prisoner the a p s o ki gs as a hole e e totally indecipherable, since the observable horizon was inevitably very narrow in scope (ibid.: 24). The witness in most cases is not a hero either, nor an exceptional being, but rather someone who was permitted to survive thanks to a combination of chance circumstances. To put it differently, the value of testimony and its veracity should no doubt be assessed in the terrain of historical truth and sociological analysis, but its significance goes well beyond that: testimony, to begin with, provides the survivor with a reason to live; it allows him/her to build an authority that frees him/her from the mere status of victim while also allowing for him/her to claim an identity where trauma is overcome; in short, it gives him/her a winner status in the war against memory that we fi d i s i ed i the Thi d 'ei h s e ti e s ste of e te i atio (ibid.: 18). it ess s sile e as fi ally ruptured. It is not so much that witnesses had not spoken out until then; they had indeed, and in many different ways. Still -as is often mentioned -no one had ever shown any interest in listening to them, not just in Europe and Israel but especially in other parts of the world. The big public moment with regard to bringing the Nazi leade s to justi e, the Nu e e g t ials, had a el oa hed the issue of the i ti s perspective or even of the Holocaust itself, which the trials tended to view as just a facet among others of World War II, a terrible facet for sure, but still a long way from its significance as civilizational rupture, as it was to be labeled by future reflection. This is tantamount to saying that there existed no public space for witness bearing in the post-war period, i.e., the prevailing conditions for enunciation were then wholly unfavorable to the articulation of memory, in a public context that was dominated by the wish to forget.
The problem, however, has to do not just with a hostile environment, but with the no less important fact that lived experience seldom lets itself be articulated right away. It takes long, hard work to win back the possibility of making memory speak. Robert Antelme, who nevertheless had published L'espèce humaine, one of the first major testimonies about this self-enclosed universe, as early as 1947, describes the issue in all its rawness:
[W]ith us we brought back our memory of our experience, an experience that was still very much alive, and we felt a frantic desire to describe it such as it had been. As of those first days, however, we saw that it was impossible to bridge the gap we discovered opening up between the words at our disposal and that experience which, in the case of most of us, was still going fo a d ithi ou odies. […] No sooner would we begin to tell our story than we would be choking over it. And then, even to us, what we had to tell would start to seem unimaginable.
The disproportion between the experience we had lived through and the account we were able to give of it would only be confirmed subsequently. (Antelme, 1992: 3) No wonder it was only in the 1960s that such crucial narratives as Jorge Semprú s The Long Voyage, Primo Le i s If This Is a Man, and many others emerged on the scene with widespread repercussions. And no wonder, too, that the Adolf Eichmann case was perhaps also, in this regard, a decisive caesura in terms of confronting the Holocaust (Levi and Rothberg, 2003) . In her relevant critique of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Ha ah A e dt s controversial report on the banality of evil (Arendt, 1990) , Shoshana Felman keenly emphasizes the extent of that caesura precisely from the standpoint of what one might call the emancipation of testimony. Emancipation indeed, because at the same time that it for once massively gave voice to the victims (with over a hundred survivors attending as witnesses) and that it gave absolute centrality to that voice, the space of the courtroom where Eichmann was tried also offered the possibility of finding a public mode of enunciation for a memory that until then had been confined to private space. Thus Felman suggestively views the court as a space of translation, that is, a space for translating private memory into pubic discourse, which in turn allows the testifying subject, in that same act, to reconstruct an identity beyond trauma.
From this point or view, the Eichmann case was a privileged moment of discursive production for hitherto silenced or otherwise excluded voices, a moment when a public discourse of testimony was constituted. One should not view that public discourse as a monolithic space, but rather as a tight discursive web where the irreducibly private nature of individual testimony can be merged with a discursive stream in which the subject overcomes the irreparable solitude inherent in the memory of his or her suffering, at the point in which the subject finally finds the possibility of translating memory and, in so doing, of sharing the language of a collective experience. That is why, in the words of Shoshana Felman, the Eichmann trial is a revolutionary event: It is this revolutionary transformation of the victim that akes the i ti s story happen for the first time, and happen as a legal act of authorship of history (Felman, 2001: 320) . This act of authorship constitutes an exercise of memory that is not concerned with the past or with a reconstruction of the past. Instead, it focuses on the construction of a present and future identity, one that radically alters the status of the victim. It is an act that literally makes the world livable. In fact, as Semprún (1995: 19) and Kertész (2002) , among others, put it hile i pli itl alludi g to Ado o s u h de ated e di t o the a a i atu e of all poetry to be written after Auschwitz, the point is not that life in the camps cannot be represented, but simply that it cannot be lived. On the contrary, it is precisely the act of representation -a d K tesz goes as fa as o side i g that the concentration camp is imaginable only and exclusively as literature, never as reality, even though he had lived that reality himself (2002: 146) -it is the practical affirmation of the possibility of representation, that allows the very existence of a future and makes the world livable after Auschwitz. In the context of the Eichmann case, just like in the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials, there is a special significance in the transformation of the criminal court into a space where the universe of testimony is allowed to resonate and be collectively constructed.
10 Again in the words of Shoshana Felman, For the world to be livable after the Holocaust, a human narrative of the past catastrophe and of the past devastation needed to be legally articulated and combined with future rules of law (Felman, 2001: 235) .
One of the most salient chapters in The Drowned and the Saved concerns the structures of communication and incommunication in the death camps. According to Primo Levi, the possibility of survival was outright lost by virtue of the inability to communicate and thereby gain quick access to vital information. Many of the prisoners could not speak German and the camp was a Babel of tongues and dialects. It often happened that the language of your fellow prisoner was no more familiar than the language of the oppressors. Furthermore, the language of the oppressors was a discourse with its own rules. It was the language of violence as analysed by Viktor Klemperer (1991) , which even the German-speaking prisoners had to learn. This means that the ability to translate was a basic requirement for personal survival. In this case, however, the space of translation is confined to the survival function a d does ot e tail a st e gthe i g of the su je t s apa ilities e o d hat is ost immediate. It is an instrumental kind of translation, whereby language is reduced to a purely functional role. In contrast, testimony offers a space for recovering language and also, as a result of that, for building community and gaining authority. It is as an author, indeed as someone who has the ability to generate a discourse of memory that can be combined with a collective discourse and affirm his/her own place within that discourse, that the survivor secures for himself or herself the possibility of a future, albeit a precarious one.
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Nowadays a diversity of projects devoted to the establishment of visual archives -among others, the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale University and, more recently, the Survivors of the Shoah Visual History Foundation, founded by Steven Spielberg -are proving to be crucial tools for creating a public space of testimony (Assmann, 2006) .
Even more so than written records, video recordings, by force of their performative nature, generate a kind of event that allows for communication not just through words, or that which is said, but also through that which manifestly remains unsaid in what is said -that in 10 Ge a pla ight Pete Weiss s Die Ermittlung (The Investigation), a 1965 docudrama portraying the Auschwitz trials through a montage of the court transcripts, captures that significance in a particularly poignant way. 11 For a wide-ranging discussion on the relationship between testimony and translation, see Insana (2009 
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